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Abstract The interconnectivity of cyber and physical systems and Internet of things
has created ubiquitous concerns of cyber threats for enterprise system managers. It
is common that the asset owners and enterprise network operators need to work with
cybersecurity professionals to manage the risk by remunerating them for their efforts
that are not directly observable. In this paper, we use a principal-agent framework to
capture the service relationships between the two parties, i.e., the asset owner (princi-
pal) and the cyber risk manager (agent). Specifically, we consider a dynamic systemic
risk management problem with asymmetric information where the principal can only
observe cyber risk outcomes of the enterprise network rather than directly the efforts
that the manager expends on protecting the resources. Under this information pattern,
the principal aims to minimize the systemic cyber risks by designing a dynamic con-
tract that specifies the compensation flows and the anticipated efforts of the manager
by taking into account his incentives and rational behaviors. We formulate a bi-level
mechanism design problem for dynamic contract design within the framework of a
class of stochastic differential games. We show that the principal has rational con-
trollability of the systemic risk by designing an incentive compatible estimator of
the agent’s hidden efforts. We characterize the optimal solution by reformulating the
problem as a stochastic optimal control program which can be solved using dynamic
programming. We further investigate a benchmark scenario with complete informa-
tion and identify conditions that yield zero information rent and lead to a new cer-
tainty equivalence principle for principal-agent problems. Finally, case studies over
networked systems are carried out to illustrate the theoretical results obtained.
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1 Introduction
Cybersecurity is a critical issue in modern enterprise networks due to the adoption
of advanced technologies, e.g., Internet of things (IoT), cloud and data centers, and
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system, which create abundant
surfaces for cyber attacks [19, 37, 46]. Due to the interconnections between nodes in
the network, the cyber risk can propagate and escalate into systemic risks, which have
been a major contributor to massive spreading of Mirai botnets, phishing messages,
and ransomware, causing information breaches and financial losses. In addition, sys-
temic risks are highly dynamic by nature as the network faces a continuous flow of
cybersecurity incidents. Hence, it becomes critical for the network and asset owner
to protect resources from cyber attacks.
The complex interdependencies between nodes and fast evolution nature of threats
have made it challenging to mitigate systemic risks of enterprise network and thus re-
quires expert knowledge from cyber domains. The asset owners or system operators
need to delegate tasks of risk management including security hardening and risk mit-
igation to security professionals. As depicted in Fig. 1, the owner can be viewed as
a principal who employs a security professional to fulfill tasks that include moni-
toring the network, patching the software and devices, and recovering machines from
failures. The security professionals can be viewed as an agent whose efforts are remu-
nerated by the principal. This principal-agent type of interaction models the service
relationships between the two parties. The effort of the agent can be measured by the
hours he spends on the security tasks. Moreover, the amount of allocated effort has
a direct impact on the systemic cyber risk. For example, with more frequent scans
on suspicious files and the Internet traffic at each node, the cyber risk becomes low
and less likely to spread. An agent plays an important role in systemic risk as he can
determine the amount of his effort and the way of distributing efforts on protecting
nodes over the network. Hence, it is essential for the principal to incentivize the agent
to distribute his resources desirably to protect the network.
In the cyber risk management of enterprise network, one distinction is the lack
of knowledge of the principal about the effort spent by the agent. The principal is
only able to observe risk outcomes, e.g., the denial or failures of services and con-
spicuous performance degradation. Moreover, due to the randomness in the cyber
network, e.g., the biased assessment of risks and the unknown attack behaviors, the
cyber risk evolves under uncertainties, making it difficult for the principal to infer the
exact effort of the agent from the observations. This type of incomplete information
structure is called moral hazard in contracts, under which the asset owner aims to
minimize the systemic cyber risk by providing sufficient incentives to the risk man-
ager through a dynamic contract that specifies the compensation flows and suggested
effort, while the risk manager’s objective is to maximize his payoff with minimum
effort by responding to the agreed contract.
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Fig. 1 Systemic cyber risk management for enterprise network. The asset owner (principal) delegates the
risk management tasks, e.g., network monitoring and software patching, to security professionals (agents)
by designing a contract which specifies the remuneration schemes. The amount of remuneration is directly
related to the systemic risk outcome of the network.
The dynamic principal-agent problem has an asymmetric information structure
in which the risk manager determines his effort over time, while this effort is hidden
to or unobservable by the asset owner. This information structure makes the con-
tract design a challenging decision making problem. Conventional methods to ad-
dress problems of incomplete information include information state based separation
principle [34, 35] and belief update scheme [23]. However, these methods cannot be
directly applied to design an optimal contract for the players. To address this chal-
lenge, we develop a systematic solution methodology which includes an estimation
phase, a verification phase, and a control phase. Specifically, we first anticipate the
risk manager’s optimal effort based on the systemic risk outcome by designing an es-
timator for the principal. Then, we show that the principal has rational controllability
of the systemic risk by verifying that the estimated effort is incentive compatible. Fi-
nally, we transform the problem using decision variables that adapt to the principal’s
information set and obtain the solution by solving a reformulated standard stochastic
control program.
The optimal dynamic mechanism design (ODMD) includes the compensation
flows and the suggested effort. The designed optimal dynamic contract includes the
compensations for direct cost of effort, discounted future revenue, cyber risk uncer-
tainties, as well as incentive provisions. Furthermore, under the incentive compatible
contract, the risk manager’s behavior is strategically neutral in the sense that his cur-
rent action depends solely on the present stage’s cost. The policies of the optimal
contract can be determined by solving a stochastic optimal control problem. Under
mild conditions, the decision variables associated with the suggested effort and the
compensation can be solved in parallel, leading to a separation principle for dynamic
mechanism design. As a benchmark problem for comparison, we further investigate
the dynamic contract under full information where the principal can fully observe the
agent’s effort. In general cases, we show that there is a positive information rent quan-
tifying the difference of principal’s objective value between the contracts designed
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under incomplete information and full information. In addition, we identify condi-
tions under which the information rent is degenerated to zero, yielding a certainty
equivalence principle in which the mechanism designs under full and asymmetric
information become identical. For example, the hidden-action impact is absent in
the linear quadratic (LQ) case where the principal achieves a perfect estimation and
control of the risk manager’s dynamic effort.
The incentive provided by the principal to the agent is critical for mitigating the
cyber risk. Without sufficient control effort, the risk would grow and propagate over
the network. Under the optimal dynamic contract, both the systemic cyber risk and
adopted effort decrease over time. Moreover, the effort converges to a positive con-
stant and the systemic risk can remain at a low level. Furthermore, a higher network
connectivity requires the agent to spend more effort to reduce the systemic cyber risk.
In the linear quadratic (LQ) scenario, we observe that the nodes in the cyber network
have self-accountability, i.e., the amount of effort allocated on each node depends
only on its risk influences on other nodes and is independent of exogenous risks com-
ing from neighboring nodes. This observation enables large-scale implementation of
distributed risk mitigation policy by determining the outer degrees of the nodes.
The contributions of this work are summarized as follows.
1) We formulate a dynamic mechanism design problem for systemic cyber risk man-
agement of enterprise networks under hidden-action type of incomplete informa-
tion.
2) We provide a systematic methodology to characterize the optimal mechanism
design by transforming the problem into a stochastic optimal control problem
with compatible information structures.
3) We define the concept of “rational controllability” to capture the feature of indi-
rect control of cyber risks by the principal, and identify the explicit conditions
under which the designed dynamic contract is incentive compatible.
4) We identify a separation principle for dynamic contract design under mild con-
ditions, where the estimation variable capturing the suggested risk management
effort and the control variable specifying the compensation can be determined
separately.
5) We reveal a certainty equivalence principle for a class of dynamic mechanism
design problems where the information rent is zero, i.e., the contracts designed
under asymmetric and full information cases coincide.
6) We observe that larger enterprise network connectivity and risk dependency strength
require the principal to provide more incentives to the agent. Under the optimal
contract in the LQ case, the allocated effort depends on the nodes’ outer degree,
leading to a self-accountable and distributed risk mitigation scheme.
1.1 Related Work
Cybersecurity becomes a critical issue due to the large-scale deployment of smart de-
vices and their integration with information and communication techologies (ICTs)
[42,46]. Hence, security risk management is an important task which has been investi-
gated in different research fields, such as communications and infrastructures [17,55],
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cloud computing [48] and IoT [21]. The interconnections between nodes and devices
make the risk management a challenge problem as the cyber risk can propogate and
escalate into systemic risk [28], and hence the interdependent security risk analy-
sis is necessary [18]. Managing systemic risk is nontrivial as demonstrated in finan-
cial systems [11], critical infrastructures [24], and communication networks [22].
In a network with a small number of agents, graph-theoretic methods have been
widely adopted to model the strategic interactions and risk interdependencies be-
tween agents [11,27]. When the number of nodes becomes large, [15] has proposed a
mean-field game approach where a representative agent captures the system dynam-
ics. Different from [1, 26] in minimizing the static systemic risk at equilibrium, we
focus in this paper on a mechanism design problem that can reduce the systemic risks
by understanding the system dynamics.
Dynamic games of incomplete or imperfect information have been studied within
the context of different classes of games, such as repeated games [3], differential
games [13], and stochastic games [54]. Many types of information structures that
entail incomplete or imperfect information have been investigated in the literature,
such as partial or noisy measurements of system states [4, 8, 33–35], and asymmet-
ric information for the players [14, 31, 32]. Approaches to control and optimization
under classical information structures, also extended to games, include the infor-
mation state based separation principle [16, 34, 35], belief updates on players’ pri-
vate information [23], generalized belief states of agents [33], and control over net-
works [52]. Decision-making under nonclassical information structures has also been
studied (such as [5,9,47]), where the players are coupled through the system dynam-
ics and/or the performance indices do not share the same information and could be
memoryless. Our bi-level dynamic mechanism design problem exhibits a unique in-
formation structure in that the principal delegates the risk control tasks to the agent
without observing the applied control effort, while the agent has complete informa-
tion of the system, which leads to informational asymmetry.
Dynamic mechanism design has been studied broadly [2, 30]. In [25], the au-
thors have provided a comprehensive summary of dynamic contract design based on
the stochastic maximum principles where solving forward-backward stochastic dif-
ferential equations (FBSDEs) becomes necessary. Instead of controlling the output
density using Girsanov transform, which has an indirect interpretation in applica-
tions [45, 50], the authors in [10, 44] directly control the system output and adopt
an alternative approach by regarding the agent’s future payoff as a variable in the
stochastic control dynamics. Our approach in this paper adopts the agent’s current
payoff as a state variable which is different from the above discussed methods. The
purpose of this work is to develop risk management solutions for networked systems
using a remuneration scheme that combines intermediate and terminal compensa-
tions. We will develop a systematic solution methodology for this class of problems
by capturing the systemic cyber risk dynamics and provide principles for optimal
mechanism design.
The current work is different from the preliminary version [20] in multiple as-
pects. First and foremost, in [20], the risk management policy is designed only for
the LQ framework, while the current one extends the model to arbitrarily general
scenarios. Thus, the analysis and derived results in this work are much more funda-
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mental by focusing on a broader class of dynamic contract design problems. Second,
we additionally investigate the dynamic contract design under full information for
comparison and obtain a new certainty equivalence principle for a number of sce-
narios. Third, we provide comprehensive motivations for the established dynamic
risk model in the problem formulation, and include discussion and illustration on
the timing of events during contract design. Fourth, the introduction section is sub-
stantially expanded, including depiction of risk management for enterprise networks,
background on systemic risks, and description of explicit contributions of the work.
Fifth, we enrich the related work section completely by discussing more literature
and highlight the differences. Sixth, we include a higher number of case studies to
thoroughly illustrate the dynamic contract design principles for systemic cyber risk
management in enterprise networks.
1.2 Organization of the Paper
The paper is organized as follows. We formulate the systemic cyber risk management
problem in Section 2. Section 3 analyzes the dynamic contract forms and the incen-
tive constraints. Section 4 reformulates the principal’s problem and solves a linear
quadratic case explicitly. Section 5 presents a complete-information benchmark sce-
nario for comparison. Section 6 presents examples to illustrate the dynamic contract
design for systemic risk management. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Problem Formulation
This section formulates the dynamic systemic cyber risk management problem of en-
terprise networks under asymmetric information using a principal-agent framework,
and presents an overview of the adopted methodology.
2.1 Systemic Cyber Risk Management
An enterprise network is comprised of a set N of nodes, where N = {1,2, ...,N}.
Due to the interdependencies among different nodes and fast changing nature of the
threats, mitigating the systemic cyber risk is a challenging task which requires exper-
tise from cybersecurity professionals. For example, to reduce the enterprise network
vulnerability, it requires a constant monitoring of the Internet traffic into and out of
the system, regular patching and updating of the device software, and continuous traf-
fic scanning for intrusion detection. The principal1 can delegate the risk management
tasks over a time period [0,T ] to a professional manager.
The cyber risk of each node depends on the level of compliance with security
criteria, the number of vulnerabilities of the software and hardware assets, the system
configurations, and the concerned threat models [43]. The risk also evolves over time
1 The principal refers to the network/asset owner, and the agent refers to the risk manager or security
professional which are used interchangeably.
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Fig. 2 Systemic cyber risk management of an enterprise network containing two nodes. The cyber risk at
node i is denoted by Y it and the applied risk manager’s effort is E
i
t , i ∈ {1,2}. The cyber risk at each node
depends on its system configuration, the attack model, and the risk manager’s effort. Note that the cyber
risk can propagate due to the connections between nodes.
as the enterprise node constantly updates its software, introduces new functionalities,
and interconnects with other nodes. We let Y it ∈ R be the state of node i ∈ N to
capture the risk of each node that maps the system configurations at time t and the
threat models to the associated risk. For example, under the advanced persistent threat
(APT) type of cyber attacks, one can assess the node’s risk using FlipIt game model
in which the defender strategically configures the system by reclaiming the control
of the node with some frequencies [49]. The FlipIt game outcome yields node’s risk
which is the expected proportion of time that the node may be compromised by the
adversary. As the nodes in the enterprise network are connected, their risks become
interdependent. We use an N×N-dimensional real matrix A with non-negative entries
to model the influence of node i on node j, i, j ∈ N . The diagonal entries in A
represent the strength of internal risk evolution, and the off-diagonal entries capture
the risk influence magnitude between nodes [21,41]. For convenience, the risk profile
of the network is denoted by Yt = [Y 1t ,Y
2
t , · · · ,Y Nt ]. The dynamics of the risk profile
describes the evolution of the systemic risk of the whole network.
To manage the risk profile, the risk manager can apply effort continuously over
the time period [0,T ]. Specifically, at every time t, t ∈ [0,T ], the risk manager can
spend effort Et ∈ E ⊆ RN+ on the nodes that mitigates the systemic cyber risk, where
E is a compact set. As fore-mentioned, the effort can be measured by the amount
of time and effectiveness of the risk manager spent on monitoring the cyberspace of
the enterprise network. The amount of reduced risk is monotonically increasing with
the allocated effort Et [40]. This fact is reflected by many security practices, e.g.,
frequent scanning and analyzing the log files as well as timely patching the software
can reduce the probability of successful cyber compromise by the adversary. Another
critical factor to be considered is that the cyber risk faces uncertainties due to the
randomness in the cyber network, e.g., the biased assessment and measurement of
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The principal designs contract:
                            and suggested 
effort (Period 1). 
The agent decides whether to accept 
the contract or not (Period 2).
Based on the cyber risk     , the agent is 
dynamically remunerated with     for 
his effort according to the agreed 
contract (Period 4).
After finishing the task,  the agent 
is further remunerated with    
(Period 5).
Time line
Contracting stage Execution stage
If the agent accepts the contract, 
he spends effort                      in 
the cyber risk management 
(Period 3).
, }, [0, ],{ t Tc t Tp 
, [0, ],t tE T
tY
tp
Tc
Fig. 3 Timeline of the dynamic contract design for systemic cyber risk management.
risk losses and under-modelling of random cyber threats [39]. Similar to [15], we use
an N-dimensional standard Brownian motion Bt which is defined on the complete
probability space (Ω ,F ,P) to model the risk uncertainties on nodes. For clarity, Fig.
2 depicts an example of cyber risk management of the enterprise network containing
two interdependent nodes. Each node stands for a subnetwork with its own system
configuration, and the adversary can target different assets, e.g., application servers
and workstations. The risk manager applies efforts E1t and E
2
t to node 1 and node 2
continuously to reduce the cyber risks Y 1t and Y
2
t , respectively. The interdependency
between two nodes is captured by the factor A12 = A21.
In sum, we focus on a model of systemic cyber risk evolution described by the
following stochastic differential equation (SDE):
dYt = AYtdt−Etdt+Σt(Yt)dBt ,
Y0 = y0,
(1)
where y0 ∈RN+ is a known positive vector denoting the initial systemic risk. LetDN×N+
denote the space of diagonal real matrices with positive elements. Then, Σt : RN →
DN×N+ captures the volatility of cyber risks in the network. Here, the diffusion co-
efficient Σt(Yt) indicates that the magnitude of uncertainty can be related to the dy-
namic risk of each node. We assume that the entries in Σt(Yt) are bounded, satisfying∫ T
0 ‖Σt(Yt)1N‖2dt ≤ C1 almost surely, where C1 is a positive constant, ‖ · ‖ denotes
the standard Euclidean norm, and 1N is an N-dimensional vector with all ones. Fur-
thermore, the risk manager’s effort Et satisfies the condition
∫ T
0 |Et |dt ≤ C2 almost
surely, where C2 is a positive constant. Since the manager can apply effort to every
node through Et , the systemic risk level Yt is fully manageable in the sense that more
effort on each node reduces its cyber risk more significantly. Note that the model in
(1) captures the characteristics of systemic cyber risks of enterprise network, and it
is also adopted in various others’ risk management scenarios inluding cyber-physical
industrial control systems [53] and financial networks [29].
As shown in Fig. 3, the dynamic contract design for cyber risk management can
be broken into two stages, namely the contracting stage and the execution stage. In
the contracting stage, the principal first provides a dynamic contract that specifies the
payment rules for the risk management to the agent and suggested/anticipated effort.
Then, the agent chooses to accept the contract or not based on the provided benefits.
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If the agent accepts, then at the execution stage he needs to determine the adopted
effort Et to reduce the systemic cyber risk. During the task, the principal observes the
dynamic risk outcome Yt and pays pt ∈P ⊆R+ compensation to the agent according
to the agreed contract, whereP is a compact set. After completing the task, the agent
also receives a terminal payment cT ∈ R+ which finalizes the contract.
Therefore, the principal needs to decide on the payment process {pt}0≤t≤T as
well as the final compensation cT by observing the systemic risks. Note that the ef-
fort level Et , t ∈ [0,T ], is hidden information of the agent, which corresponds to the
hidden-action scenario, or moral hazard, in contract theory. This feature a reflection
of the fact that the principal (asset owner) of the enterprise network cares about the
cyber risk outcome Yt rather than the implicit effort Et adopted by the risk manager.
Furthermore, we denote the principal’s information set by Yt , representing the aug-
mented filtration generated by {Ys}0≤s≤t . The agent’s information set is denoted by
At , including {Ys}0≤s≤t and {Bs}0≤s≤t . Note that for the agent, knowing {Ys}0≤s≤t
or {Bs}0≤s≤t is equivalent as he can determine one based on the other using also his
effort process {Es}0≤s≤t . Specifically, at time t, the principal’s knowledge includes
only the path of Ys, 0 ≤ s ≤ t. In comparison, the agent can observe every term in
the system, including the principal’s information as well as the path of Bs, 0≤ s≤ t.
The principal observes risk outcome Yt , and his goal is to reduce the systemic risk by
providing incentives to the manager. Therefore, the principal has no direct control of
the systemic risk, and the difficulty he faces is in designing an efficient remuneration
scheme based only on the limited observable information.
Next, we rewrite the YT -measurable terminal payment as cT =
∫ T
0 dct + c0, to
facilitate the contract analysis, where ct has an interpretation of cumulative payment
during [0, t], and c0 is a constant to be determined. Note that c0 is a virtual initial
payment and the agent receives it not at initial time 0, but rather at the terminal time
T which is captured by the term cT . The evolution of the aggregated equivalent Yt -
measurable financial income process Mt of the cyber risk manager can be described
by
dMt = dct + ptdt. (2)
The cyber risk manager’s cost function is:
JA ({Et}0≤t≤T ;{pt}0≤t≤T ,cT ) = E
∫ T
0
e−rt fA(t, pt ,Et)dt+ e−rT hA(MT ), (3)
where E is the expectation operator, r ∈ R+ is a discount factor, fA : [0,T ]×R+×
E → R is the running cost, and hA : R+→ R− is the terminal cost. The function fA
is (implicitly) composed of two terms: the cost of spending effort Et in risk man-
agement, and the received compensation pt from the principal. Note that the final
compensation cT is incorporated into hA(MT ). Assumptions we make on the two ad-
ditive terms of the cost functions are as follows.
Assumption 1 The running cost function fA(t, pt ,Et) is uniformly continuous and
differentiable in pt and Et . Further, it is monotonically decreasing in pt , and mono-
tonically increasing and strictly convex in Et . The terminal cost function hA(MT ) is a
continuously differentiable, convex, and monotonic decreasing function.
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The principal’s cost function, on the other hand, is specified as:
JP({pt}0≤t≤T ,cT ) = E
∫ T
0
e−rt fP(t,Yt , pt)dt+ e−rT (cT +hP(YT )) , (4)
where fP : [0,T ]×RN ×P → R is the running cost, and hP : RN → R denotes the
terminal cost. The function fP captures the instantaneous cost of dynamic systemic
risk and the payment to the agent.
Assumption 2 The running cost for the principal, fP(t,Yt , pt), is uniformly continu-
ous and differentiable in Yt and pt . Further, it is monotonically increasing in pt and
Yt . The terminal cost for the principal, hP(YT ), is a continuously differentiable and
monotonic increasing function.
2.2 Dynamic Principal-Agent Model
In cyber risk management, the principal contracts with the agent over [0,T ]. For a
given contract, the risk manager is strategic in minimizing the net cost. This rational
behavior can be captured by the following definition.
Definition 1 (Incentive Compatibility) Under a given payment process {pt}0≤t≤T
and terminal compensation cT of the principal, the effort trajectory {E∗t }0≤t≤T of the
agent is incentive compatible (IC) if it optimizes the cost function (3), i.e.,
JA ({E∗t }0≤t≤T ;{pt}0≤t≤T ,cT )
≤ JA ({Et}0≤t≤T ;{pt}0≤t≤T ,cT ) ,∀Et ∈ E , t ∈ [0,T ].
(5)
The asset owner needs to provide sufficient incentives for the agent to fulfill the
task of risk management, and this fact is captured through individual rationality as
follows.
Definition 2 (Individual Rationality) The agent’s policy is individually rational
(IR) if the effort trajectory {E∗t }0≤t≤T leads to satisfaction of
JA ({E∗t }0≤t≤T ;{pt}0≤t≤T ,cT ) = infEt∈E JA ({Et}0≤t≤T ;{pt}0≤t≤T ,cT )≤ JA, (6)
where JA is a predetermined non-positive constant.
Note that the non-positiveness of JA ensures the profitability of risk manager by ful-
filling the risk management tasks.
We next provide precise formulations of the problems faced by the agent and the
principal. Under a contract {{pt}0≤t≤T ,cT}, the agent minimizes his total cost by
solving the following problem:
(O−A) : min
Et∈E , t∈[0,T ]
JA ({Et}0≤t≤T ;{pt}0≤t≤T ,cT )
subject to the stochastic dynamics (1), and the payment process (2).
Dynamic Contract Design for Systemic Cyber Risk Management
By taking into account the IC and IR constraints, the principal addresses the fol-
lowing optimization problem:
(O−P) : min
pt∈P, t∈[0,T ], cT
JP({pt}0≤t≤T ,cT )
subject to the stochastic dynamics (1), IC (5), and IR (6).
Note that the designed contract terms {pt}0≤t≤T and cT should adapt to the infor-
mation available to the principal in view of the underlying incomplete information.
Denote the solution to (O−P) by {p∗t }0≤t≤T and c∗T . We present the solution concept
of the formulated problem as follows.
Definition 3 (Optimal Dynamic Mechanism Design (ODMD)) The ODMD con-
sists of the contract {{p∗t }0≤t≤T ,c∗T} as well as the effort process {E∗t }0≤t≤T that
solve the problems (O−P) and (O−A), respectively. In addition, the compensation
processes p∗t and c∗T are adapted to Yt and YT , respectively, and the risk manager’s
effort E∗t is adapted to At .
Remark: ODMD captures the bi-level interdependent decision making of the prin-
cipal and the agent, which is a Stackelberg differential game with a nonstandard in-
formation structure. Since the principal (leader) delegates the control task to the agent
(follower) but cannot observe his adopted action, ODMD features the limited nature
of the principal’s information.
Due to the hidden effort of the risk manager, (O−P) is not a classical stochastic
optimal control problem. Specifically, the principal only observes the cyber risk out-
come rather than the effort which has to be incentivized. To address this challenge
brought about by the presence of asymmetric information, we adopt a systematic
approach to design an incentive compatible and optimal mechanism.
2.3 Overview of the Methodology
We present an overview of the steps involved in our derivation, with details worked
out in the following sections.
The principal first estimates the risk manager’s effort based on the systemic risk
output (estimation phase), and then verifies that the estimated effort is incentive com-
patible (verification phase), and finally designs an optimal compensation scheme un-
der the incentive compatible estimator (control phase). To address the challenge, our
goal is to transform the problem using variables that adapt to the principal’s informa-
tion set. To this end, the principal first assumes that the agent behaves optimally with
effort level E∗t (even though the principal does not know the exact value) and calcu-
lates the corresponding cost of the agent. Another interpretation for this step would
be that the principal anticipates the agent implementing E∗t which satisfies the IC
constraint. Then, the principal designs the terminal payment form using the estimated
agent’s cost (Section 3.1). The agent responds to the contract strategically through his
best effort Eot . When the anticipated E
∗
t coincides with E
o
t , E
∗
t is an incentive com-
patible estimator and the principal facilitates the agent implementing E∗t successfully
(Section 3.2). Therefore, the principal can determine the optimal payment p∗t based
on E∗t by solving a standard stochastic optimal control problem (Section 4.2).
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3 Analysis of Risk Manager’s Incentives
We first provide a form of the terminal payment contract term and then focus on
deriving an incentive compatible estimator of the cyber risk manager’s effort.
3.1 Terminal Payment Analysis
We first present the following result on the IR constraint.
Lemma 1 The IR constraint holds as an equality, i.e.,
JA ({E∗t }0≤t≤T ;{pt}0≤t≤T ,cT ) = JA. (7)
Proof If JA ({E∗t }0≤t≤T ;{pt}0≤t≤T ,cT )< JA, the designed contract is not optimal as
the principal can further reduce his cost by paying less to the agent. uunionsq
Next, we first express the agent’s cost under the principal’s information set Yt
as well as using the property that the agent chooses an optimal E∗t , and then use the
principal’s estimation about the agent’s cost to characterize the cumulative payment
process. We introduce a new variable Wt representing the expected future cost of the
agent anticipated by the principal as follows:
Wt = E
[∫ T
t
e−r(s−t) fA
(
s, ps,E∗s )ds+ e
−r(T−t)hA(MT )
∣∣Yt] . (8)
Note that Wt is evaluated under the information available to the principal at time t.
Thus, the total expected cost of the agent under the information Yt can be expressed
as
Ut = E
[∫ T
0
e−rt fA
(
t, pt ,Et
)
dt+ e−rT hA(MT )
∣∣Yt ,Et = E∗t ]
=
∫ t
0
e−rs fA
(
s, ps,E∗s
)
ds+ e−rtWt .
(9)
We further have conditions U0 = W0 = JA and WT = hA(MT ). The effort Et = E
∗
t
indicates that the agent behaves optimally under a given contract.
Proposition 1 The total expected cost of the agent, Ut , is a martingale under Yt . In
addition, there exists an N-dimensional progressively measureable process ζt such
that
dUt = e−rtζTt (dYt −AYtdt+E∗t dt) , (10)
where T denotes the transpose operator.
Proof First, we have
E[Ut |Yτ ] =E
[∫ τ
0
e−rs fA(s, ps,E∗s )ds+ e
−rτWτ
∣∣Yτ]
+E
[∫ t
τ
e−rs fA(s, ps,E∗s )ds+ e
−rtWt − e−rτWτ
∣∣Yτ]
=Uτ +E
[∫ t
τ
e−rs fA(s, ps,E∗s )ds+ e
−rtWt
∣∣Yτ]− e−rτWτ .
(11)
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Then, using (8), we obtain
E
[∫ t
τ
e−rs fA(s, ps,E∗s )ds+ e
−rtWt
∣∣Yτ]
= E
[∫ T
τ
e−rs fA(s, ps,E∗s )ds+ e
−rT hA(MT )
∣∣Yτ]= e−rτWτ . (12)
Hence, E[Ut |Yτ ] =Uτ , and Ut is a Yt -measurable martingale. Using martingale rep-
resentation theorem [36] yields (10). uunionsq
Based on Proposition 1, we can subsequently obtain the following lemma which
facilitates design of the terminal payment term design in the optimal contract.
Lemma 2 The aggregate equivalent income process Mt evolves according to:
dMt =
rhA(Mt)
h′A(Mt)
dt− fA(t, pt ,E
∗
t )
h′A(Mt)
dt+
1
h′A(Mt)
ζTt (dYt −AYtdt+E∗t dt)
− 1
2
h′′A(Mt)
h′A(Mt)
ζTt Σt(Yt)Σt(Yt)Tζt
h′2A (Mt)
dt.
(13)
Proof By substituting (10) into (9), we obtain
dUt = e−rt fA
(
t, pt ,E∗t
)
dt− re−rtWtdt+ e−rtdWt ,
⇒ dWt = rWtdt− fA
(
t, pt ,E∗t
)
dt+ζTt (dYt −AYtdt+E∗t dt) . (14)
Since WT = hA(MT ), we adopt the form Wt = hA(Mt) and aim to characterize the
contract that yields this form. Then, we have JA = hA(M0) = hA(c0). Further, (14)
indicates that
h′A(Mt)dMt +
1
2
h′′A(Mt)χ
2
t dt =rhA(Mt)dt− fA
(
t, pt ,E∗t
)
dt
+ζTt (dYt −AYtdt+E∗t dt) ,
(15)
where χt is the volatility of process Mt . Matching the volatility terms in (15) gives
h′2A (Mt)χ
2
t = ζTt Σt(Yt)Σt(Yt)Tζt . Then, (15) yields the result. uunionsq
Remark: Note that (10) includes information on the cyber risk dynamics (1).
Thus, (13) can be seen as a modified stochastic dynamic system of the agent with
Mt as a new state variable. In addition, ζt can be interpreted as the principal’s control
over the agent’s revenue.
Another point to be highlighted is the role of pt in (13). Here, pt is not optimal
yet and its value needs to be further determined by the principal. Currently, we can
view pt as an exogenous variable that enters the constructed dynamic contract form
(13). In addition, the feedback structure of the dynamic contract on Yt is reflected by
the cumulative payment term ct shown later in Lemma 3.
Interpretation of Dynamic Contract: The dynamic contract determines the risk
manager’s revenue in (13), which includes four separate terms. The first term, rhA(Mt )h′A(Mt )
dt,
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indicates that the risk manager’s payoff should be increased to compensate the dis-
counted future revenue. The second term,− fA(t,pt ,E∗t )h′A(Mt ) dt, is an offset of the direct cost
of agent’s effort. The third part, 1h′A(Mt )
ζTt (dYt −AYtdt+E∗t dt), is an incentive term,
which captures the agent’s benefit from spending effort in risk management. Here, the
agent’s real effort enters into the Yt term. The last one, − 12
h′′A(Mt )
h′A(Mt )
ζTt Σt (Yt )Σt (Yt )Tζt
h′2A (Mt )
dt, is
a risk compensation term (the manager is risk-averse), capturing the fact that the risk
manager faces uncertainties in the performance outcome due to the Brownian motion.
For completeness, we present the cumulative payment process ct in the following
lemma.
Lemma 3 The cumulative payment process ct evolves according to:
dct =
rhA(Mt)
h′A(Mt)
dt− fA(t, pt ,E
∗
t )
h′A(Mt)
dt+
1
h′A(Mt)
ζTt (dYt −AYtdt+E∗t dt)
− 1
2
h′′A(Mt)
h′A(Mt)
ζTt Σt(Yt)Σt(Yt)Tζt
h′2A (Mt)
dt− ptdt.
(16)
Proof The result can be directly obtained from (2) and Lemma 2. uunionsq
Lemma 3 characterizes the cumulative payment process ct with initial value c0
given by hA(c0) = JA. We focus on the class of contracts in (16), and aim to deter-
mine the optimal variables (ζt and pt ) to minimize the principal’s cost. Note that (16)
is adapted to the principal’s information set Yt , since the principal observes Mt and
Yt , determines pt , ζt , and anticipates E∗t . In addition, this payment process is directly
related to the actual effort that the agent adopts, captured by dYt . The variable ζt can
be further interpreted as the sensitivity (or gain) of contract payment to the risk dif-
ference under the agent’s optimal and actual efforts. In addition, since Wt = hA(Mt),
based on (8), we obtain
Ut = E
[∫ T
0
e−rt fA
(
t, pt ,Et
)
dt+ e−rT hA(MT )
∣∣At]
=
∫ t
0
e−rs fA
(
s, ps,E∗s
)
ds+ e−rthA(Mt),
(17)
where the conditional expectation on At admits the same value as that on Yt . Propo-
sition 1 indicates that Ut is a martingale. Then, the expected value of e−rthA(Mt) in
(17) is zero which confirms the zero expected future cost of the agent.
3.2 Incentive Analysis of Cyber Risk Manager
Recall that the principal suggests an optimal effort process E∗t by assuming that the
agent behaves optimally. However, the agent can determine his actual effort Et that
minimizes the cost JA based on At which might not be the same as E∗t that the prin-
cipal suggests. Thus, the next important problem for the principal is to determine
an incentive compatible contract. To achieve this goal, the principal determines the
process ζt and the payment pt strategically to control the agent’s actual effort Et .
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Denote by Va(t,Mt) the agent’s value function with terminal condition Va(T,MT )=
hA(MT ). The property of value function ensures that the risk management effort is
optimal if it satisfies the following dynamic programming equation: e−rtVa(t,Mt) =
minEt E{
∫ s
t e
−ru fA(u, pu,Eu)du+ e−rsVa(s,Ms)}. Then, using (1), (2), and (16), the
cyber risk manager’s revenue can be expressed as:
dMt =
rhA(Mt)
h′A(Mt)
dt− fA
(
t, pt ,E∗t
)
h′A(Mt)
dt+
1
h′A(Mt)
ζTt (E
∗
t −Et)dt
− 1
2
h′′A(Mt)
h′A(Mt)
ζTt Σt(Yt)Σt(Yt)Tζt
h′2A (Mt)
dt+
1
h′A(Mt)
ζTt Σt(Yt)dBt .
(18)
We rewrite the risk manager’s problem as follows:
(O−A′) : min
Et∈E , t∈[0,T ]
JA ({Et}0≤t≤T ;{pt}0≤t≤T ,cT )
subject to the stochastic dynamics (18), and the payment process (2).
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation associated with the stochastic optimal
control problem (O−A′) is
min
Et
[
1
2
∂ 2Va
∂M2t
(
1
h′2A (Mt)
ζTt Σt(Yt)Σt(Yt)
Tζt
)
+
∂Va
∂Mt
(
rhA(Mt)
h′A(Mt)
− fA
(
t, pt ,E∗t
)
h′A(Mt)
+
1
h′A(Mt)
ζTt (E
∗
t −Et)−
1
2
h′′A(Mt)
h′A(Mt)
ζTt Σt(Yt)Σt(Yt)Tζt
h′2A (Mt)
)
+ fA(t, pt ,Et)
]
+
∂Va
∂ t
= rVa,
Va(T,MT ) = hA(MT ).
(19)
Based on the candidate value function Va(t,Mt) = hA(Mt), the second-order con-
dition of (19) is satisfied. Then, the optimal solution to (O−A′) is
Eot = argmaxEt
∂Va
∂Mt
1
h′A(Mt)
ζTt Et − fA(t, pt ,Et)
= argmaxEt ζ
T
t Et − fA(t, pt ,Et).
(20)
For a given contract, Eot is the optimal effort of the agent. Then, when the anticipated
effort E∗t of the principal coincides with Eot , i.e., E∗t = Eot , the provided contract is IC
and E∗t is implemented. The following theorem captures this result.
Theorem 1 When the compensation process in the contract is specified by (16), then
the IC constraint is satisfied, i.e., E∗t is implemented as expected by the principal, if
and only if the following condition holds:
E∗t = argmaxEt ζ
T
t Et − fA(t, pt ,Et), (21)
where ζt is adapted to the information Yt available to the principal.
Juntao Chen et al.
Proof We verify that E∗t is implemented by the agent.
For an arbitrary process {Et}0≤t≤T , we define a variable
U˜t =
∫ t
0
e−rs fA
(
s, ps,Es
)
ds+ e−rthA(Mt),
where Mt is given by (18). Note that the HJB equation associated with (O−A′) can
also be written as 0=minEt E
[
dU˜t |At
]
. Then, we know that when Et 6= E∗t , the drift
term of U˜t is positive and yields U˜t < E[U˜T |At ]. Hence, at time t, the expected total
cost of the risk manager is greater than U˜t . When Et = E∗t , we have E
[
dU˜t |At
]
= 0,
and thus U˜t = E[U˜T |At ]. This verifies that E∗t is the incentive compatible optimal
decision of the risk manager such that his total expected cost is achieved at the lower
bound. uunionsq
Based on Theorem 1, the principal can indirectly manipulate the implemented
effort of the agent by determining the variables ζt and pt jointly. Hence, under (21),
the suggested effort E∗t is incentive compatible.
Remark: From (21), we can see that the risk manager’s behavior is strategically
neutral. Specifically, at time t, the risk manager decides on the optimal effort E∗t
based only on the current cost (term fA(t, pt ,Et)) and benefit (term ζTt Et ) instead of
future-looking variables. This neutral behavior is consistent with the fact that a larger
current effort does not induce a higher payoff for the agent after time t, since as shown
in (17), the expected future cost over time (t,T ] is zero due to the martingale property.
4 The Principal’s Problem: Optimal Dynamic Systemic Cyber Risk
Management
Our next goal is to characterize the dynamic contracts designed by the principal.
Furthermore, we present a separation principle and explicit solutions to an LQ case
in this section.
4.1 Rational Controllability
The controllability of the cyber risk is critical to the principal. To account for the
incentives in the management of risk, we have the following definition.
Definition 4 (Rational Controllability) The dynamic systemic cyber risk is ratio-
nally controllable if the principal can provide incentives {pt}0≤t≤T and cT such that
the risk manager’s effort {Et}0≤t≤T coincides with the one suggested by the principal.
In ODMD, the rational controllability indicates that under {{p∗t }0≤t≤T ,c∗T}, the
best-response behavior {E∗t }0≤t≤T of the agent is the same as the principal’s predicted
effort. The unique feature of rational controllability is that the principal cannot control
the cyber risk directly but can rely on other terms to infer the rational behavior of the
agent, which further influences the applied effort in risk management. Corollary 1
later captures this result.
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4.2 Stochastic Optimal Control Reformulation
Knowing that the cyber risk manager behaves strategically, the principal aims to im-
plement E∗t and thus (16) becomes
dct =
rhA(Mt)
h′A(Mt)
dt− fA
(
t, pt ,E∗t
)
h′A(Mt)
dt− 1
2
h′′A(Mt)
h′A(Mt)
ζTt Σt(Yt)Σt(Yt)Tζt
h′2A (Mt)
dt
− ptdt+ 1h′A(Mt)
ζTt Σt(Yt)dBt .
(22)
Instead of dealing with the complex revenue dynamics (18) of the principal, we
deal with its equivalent counterpart dht shown in Theorem 2 below, which is much
simpler. We reformulate the principal’s problem as a standard stochastic optimal con-
trol problem as follows.
Theorem 2 The principal’s problem is reformulated as a stochastic optimal control
problem as follows:
(O−P′) : min
pt∈P, ζt
E
∫ T
0
e−rt
(
fP(t,Yt , pt)− e−r(T−t)pt
)
dt
+ e−rT
(
hP(YT )+h−1A (hT )
)
such that dYt = AYtdt−E∗t dt+Σt(Yt)dBt , Y0 = y0,
dht = rhtdt− fA(t, pt ,E∗t )dt+ζTt Σt(Yt)dBt , h0 = JA,
E∗t = argmaxEt ζ
T
t Et − fA(t, pt ,Et).
Proof Recall that the expected cost of the cyber risk manager is equal to Wt = hA(Mt).
Then, under the optimal risk management effort and denoting ht = hA(Mt), we obtain
dht = rhtdt− fA(t, pt ,E∗t )dt+ζTt Σt(Yt)dBt , h0 = JA.
In addition, based on dct = dMt − ptdt, we have cT = MT −
∫ T
0 ptdt. Since MT =
h−1A (hT ), we have e
−rT cT = e−rT h−1A (hT )−e−rt
∫ T
0 e
−r(T−t)ptdt. Thus, the cost func-
tion of the principal can be rewritten as
E
∫ T
0
e−rt
(
fP(t,Yt , pt)− e−r(T−t)pt
)
dt+ e−rT
(
hP
(
YT )+h−1A (hT )
)
,
which yields the result. uunionsq
In the investigated incomplete information situations, the principal preserves the
indirect controllability of systemic risk Yt by estimating the agent’s effort E∗t as well
as specifying the contract terms pt , cT and process ζt .
Corollary 1 By providing incentives {{pt}0≤t≤T ,cT} and specifying process {ζt}0≤t≤T ,
the dynamic systemic cyber risk is rationally controllable, and the incentive compat-
ible effort follows (21). The optimal {p∗t }0≤t≤T and {ζ ∗t }0≤t≤T can be obtained from
Theorem 2.
Juntao Chen et al.
Proof The result directly follows from Theorems 1 and 2. uunionsq
Remark: Theorem 2 presents solution to a standard optimal control problem for
the principal, whose the existence and uniqueness have been well studied [51]. With
fP, hP, fA, and hA satisfying the conditions in Assumptions 1 and 2, and the corre-
sponding coefficients in the functions well selected ensuring the feasibility of (O−P′),
the control problem can be solved efficiently by numerical methods [38]. Therefore,
the ODMD for the systemic risk management problem, i.e., E∗t , p∗t , and c∗T , can be
determined from (21), (22) and Theorem 2, respectively.
4.3 Separation Principle
We next present a separation principle for the asset owner in determining the com-
pensation pt and the auxiliary parameter ζt . First, we make assumptions on the sepa-
rability of the cost functions.
(S1): The agent’s running cost can generally be separated into two parts, including
the effort and payment. Accordingly, we take fA(t, pt ,Et) to be in the form
fA(t, pt ,Et) = fA,E(Et)− fA,p(pt), (23)
where fA,E : E → R+ is monotonically increasing, continuously differentiable and
strictly convex, i.e., f ′A,E(Et) > 0 and f
′′
A,E(Et) > 0, and fA,p :P → R+. Then, the
constraint E∗t = argmaxEt ζ
T
t Et − fA(t, pt ,Et) can be simplified to
E∗t = f
′−1
A,E (ζt). (24)
(S2): We also assume that the principal’s running cost takes the form
fP(t,Yt , pt) = fP,Y (Yt)+ fP,p(pt), (25)
where fP,Y : RN → R and fP,p :P → R+ are monotonically increasing and continu-
ously differentiable.
The inverse function h−1A plays a role in the principal’s objective. We further have
the following assumption.
(L1): The agent’s terminal cost function hA is linear, i.e., hA(MT ) = γMT , where
γ < 0.
Then, we have the following separation principle.
Theorem 3 Under conditions (S1), (S2), and (L1), the principal’s problem (O−P′)
can be separated into two subproblems with respect to the decision variables ζt and
pt as:
(SP1) : min
ζt
E
∫ T
0
e−rt
(
fP,Y (Yt)− 1γ fA,E
(
f ′−1A,E (ζt)
))
dt
+ e−rT hP(YT )+
1
γ
∫ T
0
e−rtζTt Σt(Yt)dBt
such that dYt = AYtdt− f ′−1A,E (ζt)dt+Σt(Yt)dBt , Y0 = y0.
(SP2) : min
pt∈P
∫ T
0
e−rt
(
fP,p(pt)− e−r(T−t)pt + 1γ fA,p(pt)
)
dt.
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Proof For the constraint dht = rhtdt− fA,E( f ′−1A,E (ζt))dt+ fA,p(pt)dt+ζTt Σt(Yt)dBt ,
we obtain ht = erth0−
∫ t
0 e
r(t−s)[ fA,E
(
f ′−1A,E (ζs)
)− fA,p(ps)]ds+∫ t0 er(t−s)ζTs Σs(Ys)dBs.
Thus, the principal’s problem can be rewritten as
min
pt∈P,ζt
E
∫ T
0
e−rt
(
fP,Y (Yt)+ fP,p(pt)− e−r(T−t)pt
)
dt
+ e−rT
[
hP(YT )+h−1A
(
erT JA−
∫ T
0
er(T−s) fA,E
(
f ′−1A,E (ζs)
)
ds
+
∫ T
0
er(T−s) fA,p(ps)ds+
∫ T
0
er(T−s)ζTs Σs(Ys)dBs
)]
such that dYt = AYtdt− f ′−1A,E (ζt)dt+Σt(Yt)dBt , Y0 = y0.
Then, the decomposition of the problem follows naturally. uunionsq
Remark: ζt can be regarded as an estimation variable since it determines the an-
ticipated effort E∗t . The payment pt is a control variable that manipulates the risk
manager’s incentives and is determined at the control phase. Under appropriate con-
ditions, these two estimation and control variables can be designed in a separate man-
ner, yielding a separation principle in dynamic contract design for systemic risk man-
agement.
To obtain more insights, we next focus on a class of models where the value
function of the principal and the ODMD can be explicitly characterized.
4.4 ODMD in LQ Setting
In the LQ setting, the cost functions take forms as fA,E(Et)= 12 E
T
t RtEt , and fA,p(pt)=
δA pt , where Rt is a positive-definite N×N-dimensional symmetric matrix and δA is
a positive constant. Then we obtain
E∗t = f
′−1
A,E (ζt) = R
−1
t ζt . (26)
Further, we consider hP(YT ) = ρTYT , where ρ ∈RN+ maps the cyber risks to monetary
loss, and fP(t,Yt , pt) = ρTYt + δP pt , where δP is a positive constant. In addition,
hA(MT ) =−MT and Σt(Yt) =Dt ·diag(Yt), where Dt ∈RN×N and ‘diag’ is a diagonal
operator. The principal’s problem becomes:
min
pt∈P,ζt
E
∫ T
0
e−rt(ρTYt +δP pt − e−r(T−t)pt)dt+ e−rT (ρTYT −hT )
such that dYt = (AYt −R−1t ζt)dt+Dt ·diag(Yt)dBt , Y0 = y0,
dht =
(
rht − 12ζ
T
t R
−1
t ζt +δA pt
)
dt+ζTt Σt(Yt)dBt , h0 = JA.
The principal aims to maximize hT , which is equivalent to minimizing the agent’s
total revenue based on the relationship hT = −MT . The principal also considers the
agent’s participation constraint by setting h0 =W0 = JA, ensuring that the cyber risk
manager has sufficient incentive to fulfill the task.
Juntao Chen et al.
Since e−rT hT = h0−
∫ T
0 e
−rs ( 1
2ζ
T
s R
−1
s ζt −δA ps
)
ds+
∫ T
0 e
−rsζTs Ds ·diag(Ys)dBs,
the principal’s problem can be rewritten as:
min
pt∈P,ζt
E
∫ T
0
e−rt
(
ρTYt +(δP−δA)pt − e−r(T−t)pt + 12ζ
T
t R
−1
t ζt
)
dt
+ e−rTρTYT − JA
such that dYt = (AYt −R−1t ζt)dt+Dt ·diag(Yt)dBt , Y0 = y0.
According to Theorem 3, the separation principle holds in the LQ case. To determine
the optimal pt , we solve the following unconstrained optimization problem:
min
pt∈P
∫ T
0
e−rt(δP−δA− e−r(T−t))ptdt.
Depending on the values of parameters δP and δA, we obtain the following results. If
δP−δA ≥ 1, there is no intermediate payment, i.e., pt = 0, ∀t ∈ [0,T ]. In this regime,
the principal has a higher valuation on the monetary payment than the agent does.
In other words, the agent is relatively hard to be incentivized to do the risk manage-
ment. When δP−δA ≤ 0, i.e., the principal focuses more on the cyber risk deduction
rather than the expenditure on incentivizing the agent, the optimal pt is positively un-
bounded. However, in this regime, the terminal payment cT is negatively unbounded
based on (22). This contract corresponds to the scenario where the risk manager re-
ceives a large amount of intermediate payment during the task while returning it to
the principal after finishing the task which is not practical. Under 0 < δP− δA < 1,
the intermediate compensation is either 0 or unbounded depending on the time index.
Hence, to design a practical contract, we focus on the regime in which the intermedi-
ate payment is zero, and the risk manager receives a positive terminal payment cT .
To obtain the optimal {ζ ∗t }0≤t≤T , we assume that the process ζt , t ∈ [0,T ], is
non-anticipative, which can be verified later after obtaining the solution ζ ∗t . Then,
the problem can be further simplified to:
min
ζt
E
∫ T
0
e−rt
(
ρTYt +
1
2
ζTt R
−1
t ζt
)
dt+ e−rTρTYT − JA
such that dYt = (AYt −R−1t ζt)dt+Dt ·diag(Yt)dBt , Y0 = y0.
The following theorem provides the optimal solution ζ ∗t .
Theorem 4 In the LQ case, the optimal solution to the principal’s problem is given
by
ζ ∗t = Kt , (27)
where Kt satisfies, and is the unique solution to
K˙t +(A− rI)TKt +ρ = 0, KT = ρ. (28)
Furthermore, the minimum cost of the principal is given by
J∗p = K
T
0 y0+m0− JA, (29)
where m0 is obtained uniquely from
m˙t − rmt − 12K
T
t R
−1
t Kt = 0, mT = 0. (30)
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Proof Without loss of generality, we solve the optimal control problem by ignoring
the constant term JA in the cost function. The HJB equation
min
ζt
[1
2
tr
(
∂ 2Vp
∂Y 2t
Dt ·diag(Yt) ·diag(Yt)DTt
)
+
∂Vp
∂Yt
(
AYt −R−1t ζt
)
+ρTYt +
1
2
ζTt R
−1
t ζt
]
+
∂Vp
∂ t
= rVp,
Vp(T,YT ) = ρTYT ,
(31)
yields the first-order condition ζ ∗t =
∂Vp
∂Yt . Assume that the value function takes the
form: Vp(t,Y ) = 12Y
TStY +KTt Y +mt , where St is an N×N symmetric matrix with
continuously differentiable entries, Kt is a continuously differentiable N-dimensional
vector, and mt is a continuously differentiable function. Then, we obtain ζ ∗t = StYt +
Kt . Substituting ζ ∗t into the HJB equation yields
1
2
tr
(
StDt ·diag(Yt) ·diag(Yt)DTt
)
+(StYt +Kt)T(AYt −R−1t StYt −R−1t Kt)
+ρTYt +
1
2
(StYt +Kt)TR−1t (StYt +Kt)
= r
(
1
2
YTt StYt +K
T
t Yt +mt
)
− 1
2
YTt S˙tYt − K˙Tt Yt − m˙t ,
Vp(T,YT ) = ρTYT .
(32)
Denote by I the N-dimensional identity matrix and by ei the N-dimensional vector
whose i-th element is 1 and the others are zero. Matching the coefficients in (32)
further yields the following coupled ordinary differential equations (ODEs):
S˙t +StA+ATSt − rSt −StR−1t St +
1
2
N
∑
i=1
(
eieTi D
T
t StDt
)
= 0, ST = 0, (33)
K˙t +(A−R−1t St − rI)TKt +ρ = 0, KT = ρ, (34)
m˙t − rmt − 12K
T
t R
−1
t Kt = 0, mT = 0. (35)
Here, (33) is a matrix Riccati equation. However, based on the terminal condition
ST = 0, we see that the unique solution to (33) is St = 0, ∀t. Therefore, a linear value
function Vp(t,Y ) = KTt Y +mt is sufficient. Then, the ODEs (34) and (35) can be
rewritten as (28) and (30), respectively, which being linear admit unique solutions.
uunionsq
We then obtain the explicit form of optimal dynamic contract in the subsequent
lemma.
Lemma 4 In the LQ case, the optimal dynamic contract designed by the principal is
given by
dct =
(
rct +
1
2
KTt R
−1
t Kt
)
dt−KTt
(
dYt −AYtdt+R−1t Ktdt
)
=
(
rct − 12K
T
t R
−1
t Kt
)
dt−KTt (dYt −AYtdt) ,
(36)
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with c0 =−JA > 0, and Kt is given by (28). The intermediate payment pt degenerates
to zero, and the anticipated effort of the agent under the optimal contract is E∗t =
R−1t Kt .
Proof The result follows from Theorems 1, 4, and (22). uunionsq
Remark: As shown in Lemma 4, the cyber risk volatility Σt(Yt) does not impact the
optimal dynamic contract design, since the principal’s expected cost is linear in the
systemic risk Yt . When one of the functions fp, hA and hp is not linear, the volatility
Σt(Yt) will play a role in the contract design in solving the problem presented in
Theorem 2.
Even though the optimal dynamic contract does not depend on the cyber risk
volatility in the LQ case, the risk volatility influences the real compensation during
contract implementation.
Corollary 2 The terminal compensation of risk manager has a larger variance when
there are more complex interdependencies of risk uncertainties between nodes.
Corollary 2 will further be illustrated through case studies in Section 6.
5 Benchmark Scenario: Systemic Cyber Risk Management under Full
Information
In the full-information case, the principal observes the efforts that the cyber risk man-
ager implements. We first solve the team problem in which the agent cooperates with
the principal. To that end, the principal’s cost under the team optimal solution is the
best that he can achieve. Then, we aim to design a dynamic contract mechanism under
which the agent will adopt the same policy as the team optimal one. In the coopera-
tive case, the contract only needs to guarantee the participation constraint. Then, the
principal’s problem can be formulated as follows:
(O−B) : min
pt∈P,cT ,Et∈E
E
∫ T
0
e−rt fP(t,Yt , pt)dt+ e−rT (cT +hP(YT ))
such that dYt = AYtdt−Etdt+Σt(Yt)dBt , Y0 = y0,
JA ({E∗t }0≤t≤T ;{pt}0≤t≤T ,cT ) = JA.
As in the asymmetric information scenario, it is more convenient to deal with the
dynamics of the cyber risk manager’s expected cost. By designing the contract, the
principal only needs to ensure the participation of the agent. Then, the principal’s
problem can be rewritten as follows:
(O−B′) : min
pt∈P,ζt ,Et∈E
E
∫ T
0
e−rt
(
fP(t,Yt , pt)− e−r(T−t)pt
)
dt
+ e−rT
(
hP
(
YT
)
+h−1A (hT )
)
such that dYt =AYtdt−Etdt+Σt(Yt)dBt , Y0 = y0,
dht =rhtdt− fA
(
t, pt ,Et
)
dt+ζTt Σt(Yt)dBt , h0 = JA.
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With the full observation of Yt and Et , ζt can be chosen freely, and Et can be seen as
a control variable of the principal. Note that the IC constraint (21) does not enter into
(O−B′). In addition, the equivalent terminal payment process ct admits the same
form as (22). (O−B′) is a standard stochastic optimal control problem which can be
solved efficiently.
To quantify the efficiency of dynamic contract designed in Section 4, we have the
following definition.
Definition 5 (Information Rent) Denote the solutions to (O−A) and (O−P) by
{E∗t }0≤t≤T and {{p∗t }0≤t≤T ,c∗T}, respectively. Further, denote the solution to (O−B)
by {{pbt }0≤t≤T ,cbT ,{Ebt }0≤t≤T}. Then, the information rent is given by
IR = JP({p∗t }0≤t≤T ,c∗T )− JP({pbt }0≤t≤T ,cbT ). (37)
Intuitively, information rent quantifies the difference between the principal’s costs
with optimal mechanisms designed under incomplete and full information.
We have following result on information rent.
Corollary 3 The optimal cost of the principal under full information is no larger
than the one under asymmetric information. Hence, IR ≥ 0.
Proof Comparing with the optimal {E∗t }0≤t≤T in (O−P′), the implemented effort
{Ebt }0≤t≤T in (O−B′) does not depend on the variables ζt and pt . Thus, (O−B′)
admits a larger feasible solution space, which yields the result. uunionsq
5.1 LQ Setting: Certainty Equivalence Principle
To further characterize the optimal contracts under full information and quantify the
information rent, we investigate a class of special scenarios. Specifically, we take the
functions to have the same forms as in Section 4.4. The principal’s problem can then
be written as
min
pt∈P,Et∈E
E
∫ T
0
e−rt
(
ρTYt +(δP−δA)pt − e−r(T−t)pt + 12E
T
t RtEt
)
dt
+ e−rTρTYT − JA
such that dYt = (AYt −Et)dt+Dt ·diag(Yt)dBt , Y0 = y0.
Note that ζt does not appear in the optimization problem. However, ζt enters the de-
signed contract (22) through the term −ζTt Σt(Yt)dBt . In the long term contracting
when T is relatively large, the expected value of−ζTt Σt(Yt)dBt is zero which is irrel-
evant with ζt . Hence, the principal can set ζt = 0 to reduce the contract complexity.
Similar to the analysis in Section 4.4, we focus on the regime where the interme-
diate payment flow pt is zero, to avoid the unrealistic situation of negative terminal
payment. We obtain the following lemma characterizing the certainty equivalence
principle.
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Lemma 5 In the LQ settings, IR = 0 which reveals the certainty equivalence prin-
ciple, i.e., the designed optimal contracts under the incomplete information are as
efficient as those designed under complete information.
Proof By regarding Et as the role of R−1t ζt , we see that the problem is reduced to the
one in Section 4.4. Hence, the minimum cost of the principal in the full information
case is the same as that under the incomplete information. uunionsq
Remark: When the agent’s terminal cost function hA is not linear, h−1A (hT ) will
not be linear in hT . Thus, the decision variable ζt remains in the principal’s objective
function. Then, the contract design under full information becomes more efficient as
there is no dependency between ζt and Et introduced by the IC constraint.
In the LQ case, the team optimal contract is summarized as follows.
Lemma 6 In the LQ setting, the team optimal dynamic contract is
dcbt =
(
rcbt +
1
2
KTt R
−1
t Kt
)
dt,
Ebt = R
−1
t Kt ,
(38)
with cb0 =−JA > 0, and Kt is given by (28). The intermediate payment is zero.
Proof The result follows immediately from Theorem 4 and (22) with ζt = 0. uunionsq
The following lemma provides a mechanism that leads to implementation of the
team optimal solution presented in Lemma 6 without forcing the agent to follow Ebt .
Lemma 7 In the LQ setting, the implementable optimal dynamic contract designed
by the principal under full information is
dct =
(
rct − 12K
T
t R
−1
t Kt +K
T
t Et
)
dt, (39)
with c0 = −JA > 0 and Kt given by (28). The intermediate payment is zero, and the
agent’s best response is Et = R−1t Kt .
Proof Similar to the methodologies proposed in [6,7,12], we let the contract take the
following form:
dct =
(
rct +
1
2
KTt R
−1
t Kt
)
dt+Γ Tt (Et −R−1t Kt)dt, (40)
where Γt is an N-dimensional vector to be determined. The second term Γ Tt (Et −
R−1t Kt)dt is introduced to penalize the agent when his action deviates from R−1t Kt .
The agent solves his problem by responding to this announced contract from the
principal. Similar to (O−A′) and using Va(t,ct) = hA(ct) = −ct , we obtain the cor-
responding HJB equations as
min
Et
[
∂Va
∂ct
(
rct +
1
2
KTt R
−1
t Kt +Γ
T
t (Et −R−1t Kt)
)
+ fA(t, pt ,Et)
]
+
∂Va
∂ t
= rVa,
Va(T,cT ) =−cT .
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The optimal solution of the agent is achieved at
Eot = argminEt −Γ Tt Et +
1
2
ETt RtEt ,
which yields Eot = R
−1
t Γt . Based on Lemma 6, we choose Γt = Kt , and thus the agent
implements the team optimal solution Ebt . Further, (40) degenerates to the one in (38).
uunionsq
Remark: In the LQ setting under full information and incomplete information, the
optimal contract and the manager’s behavior do not relate to the risk volatility Σt(Yt)
of the network. The reason is that the cost function of the principal is linear in the
systemic risk Yt . Hence, the expectation of the risk volatility term is zero, and Σt(Yt)
does not play a role in the optimal dynamic contract. This fact in turn corroborates
the zero information rent in the LQ setting due to the removal of risk uncertainty.
A more general class of scenarios satisfying the certainty equivalence principle
that leads to zero information rent is summarized as follows.
Corollary 4 When fP(t,φ , pt), hp(φ) and hA(φ) are linear in the argument φ , then
IR = 0, where the optimal contracts under the full information and incomplete infor-
mation coincide.
Proof The linearity of functions removes the effects of risk uncertainties on the per-
formance of the principal and the agent which leads to a zero information rent. uunionsq
6 Case Studies
We demonstrate, in this section, the optimal design principles of dynamic contracts
for systemic cyber risk management of enterprise networks through examples. Specif-
ically, we first utilize a case study with one node to show that the dynamic contracts
can successfully mitigate the systemic risk in a long period of time. Then, we inves-
tigate an enterprise network with a set of interconnected nodes to reveal the network
effects in systemic risk management through dynamic contracts and discover a dis-
tributed way of mitigating the systemic risks.
6.1 One-Node System Case
First, we consider a one-dimensional case in which the enterprise network contains
only one node, i.e., Yt is a scalar. Therefore, the risk manager protects the system by
directing the security resources to this node. Note that for the LQ setting, the coupled
ODEs in Theorem 4 admit the unique solutions:
Kt =
ρ
A− r
(
(A− r+1)e(A−r)(T−t)−1
)
, mt =
K2t
2rRt
(
e−r(T−t)−1
)
. (41)
Therefore, based on Lemma 4, the optimal effort of the risk manager is
E∗t = R
−1
t ζ
∗
t =
ρ
Rt(A− r)
(
(A− r+1)e(A−r)(T−t)−1
)
, (42)
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and the optimal compensation becomes
dct =
(
rct − K
2
t
2Rt
+AKtYt
)
dt−KtdYt , c0 =−JA. (43)
If the risk manager accepts this optimal contract, then the principal’s excepted
minimum cost is equal to J∗P = KT0 y0+m0− JA.
To illustrate the optimal mechanism design, we choose specific values for the
parameters in Section 4.4: ρ = 5 k$/unit, r = 0.3, Rt = 1.5 k$/unit2, T = 1 year,
y0 = 5 unit, and JA = −10 k$. Figure 4 shows the results for varying values of the
parameter A. Note that a single node system with a larger A indicates that it is more
vulnerable and harder to mitigate the cyber risk. From Fig. 4, we find that with a
larger A, the system requires more effort from the risk manager to bring the cyber
risk down to a relatively low level. In all cases, the effort decreases as time increases,
and finally converges to a positive constant ρRt . This phenomenon indicates that when
the system risk is high, the agent should spend more effort in risk management. When
the risk is reduced to a relatively low level and the system becomes secure, then less
effort is preferable as the risk will not grow. In addition, the corresponding terminal
compensation cT increases with the amount of effort spent.
6.2 Network Case
We next investigate cyber risk management over enterprise networks and characterize
the interdependencies between nodes. The unique solutions to the ODEs in Theorem
4 are then as follows:
Kt = ρ
[
(A− rI)T]−1(((A− rI)T+ I)e(A−rI)T(T−t)− I) , (44)
mt =
KTt R
−1
t Kt
2r
(
e−r(T−t)−1
)
, (45)
The optimal effort of the risk manager is
E∗t = R
−1
t ρ
[
(A− rI)T]−1(((A− rI)T+ I)e(A−rI)T(T−t)− I) ,
and the optimal compensation follows (36).
We first consider a cyber network containing two connected nodes. The system
parameters are chosen as ρ = [5;5] k$/unit, r = 0.3, Rt = [1.5,0;0,1.5] k$/unit2,
T = 1 year, y0 = [5;5] unit, and JA =−10 k$. Moreover, we compare three scenarios
in terms of network interdependencies. Specifically, we have case 1: A= [2,0.2;0,2],
case 2: A = [2,0.5;0,2], and case 3: A = [2,0.8;0,2]. Figure 5 shows the results,
where we denote by E i∗t and Y it the effort and the corresponding risk of node i, i =
1,2, respectively. Similar to the single-node case, both the effort and systemic risk
decrease over time. Specifically, the dynamic effort converges to R−1t ρ which can be
verified directly by the analytical expression. Comparing E1∗t with E2∗t , we find that
the risk manager should spend more effort on the nodes which can heavily influence
other nodes. Even though there is no risk influence from node 1 to node 2, the optimal
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(a) Effort (b) Systemic cyber risk
(c) Cumulative payment
Fig. 4 (a), (b), and (c) show the effort, the cyber risk and the terminal payment under the optimal contract.
The terminal compensation cT increases with the spent effort of the risk manager.
effort E2∗t increases as the influence strength becomes larger from node 2 to node 1.
This phenomenon is consistent with the idea of controlling the origin to constrain
the propagation of cyber risks. Furthermore, the value of E2∗t indicates that a higher
network connectivity requires more effort to mitigate the systemic cyber risk.
We next investigate a 4-node system where the network structures are shown in
Fig. 6. The system parameters are the same as those in the 2-node case except for
the matrix A. The diagonal entries in A are all equal to 2 and the off-diagonal entries
that correspond to a link are all equal to 0.2. Figure 7 shows the results under the
optimal mechanism. The risk manager spends more effort on node 1 in cases 2 and
3 than in case 1, as the risk of node 1 can propagate to node 4 in the former two
cases. Another key observation is that the amount of allocated effort on each node
mainly depends on its risk influences on other nodes rather than on the exogenous
risks (node’s outer degree), yielding a self-accountable risk mitigation scheme. For
example, even though node 4 impacts node 2 in case 3, the risk management efforts
on node 2 are close in cases 2 and 3. A similar pattern can be seen on node 4 in cases
1 and 2. This observation provides a distributed method of risk management which
reduces the complexity of decision-making by simplifying the network structures
and classifying the nodes based on their outer degrees. By comparing three cases, we
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(a) Effort (b) Systemic cyber risk
(c) Cumulative payment
Fig. 5 (a), (b), and (c) show the effort, the systemic risk and the terminal payment under the optimal
contract. Case 1: A = [2,0.2;0,2]; Case 2: A = [2,0.5;0,2]; Case 3: A = [2,0.8;0,2]. A higher network
connectivity requires more effort to mitigate the systemic cyber risk.
Fig. 6 Three different structures of enterprise network. The risk influence strengths are the same, admitting
a value of 0.2 in matrix A.
also conclude that more complex cyber interdependencies induce higher cost on the
principal in the security investment.
Note that in the above case studies, all variables were evaluated under the expecta-
tion with respect to the cyber risk uncertainty. As shown in Corollary 2, even though
the expected compensation is independent of the network risk uncertainty, the ac-
tual compensation during contract implementation is influenced by the volatility term
Σt(Yt). We present two scenarios in Fig. 8, where Fig. 8(a) and Fig. 8(b) are the com-
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(a) Effort (b) Systemic cyber risk
(c) Cumulative payment
Fig. 7 (a), (b), and (c) show the effort, the systemic risk and the terminal payment under the optimal
contract. Each node is self-accountable for its risk influence on others.
(a) (b)
Fig. 8 (a) and (b) depict the optimal terminal payment under different risk volatility structure. The risk
volatility of nodes is independent in (a), while the influence of risk volatility in (b) admits a cycle struc-
ture as case 2 in Fig. 6. The results indicate that a larger interdependency of cyber risk volatility yields
compensation schemes with a larger variance.
pensation realizations under Σt(Yt)= I and Σt(Yt)= [1,1,0,0;0,1,1,0;0,0,1,1;1,0,0,1],
respectively. When the nodes’ risks face more sources of uncertainties in Fig. 8(b),
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the corresponding payment exhibits a larger variance comparing with the one in Fig.
8(a), which is consistent with the result of Corollary 2.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have addressed the problem of dynamic systemic cyber risk man-
agement of enterprise networks, where the principal provides contractual incentives
to the manager, which include the compensations of direct cost of effort and indirect
cost from risk uncertainties. This has involved a stochastic Stackelberg differential
game with asymmetric information in a principal-agent setting. Under the optimal
incentive compatible scheme we have designed, the principal has rational controlla-
bility of the systemic risk where the suggested and adopted efforts coincide, and the
risk manager’s behavior is strategically neutral, depending only on the current net
cost. Under mild conditions, we have obtained a separation principle where the effort
estimation and the remuneration design can be separately achieved. We further have
revealed a certainty equivalence principle for a class of dynamic mechanism design
problems where the information rent is equal to zero. Through case studies, we have
identified the network effects in the systemic risk management where the connectivity
and node’s outer degree play an important role in the decision making. Future work
on this topic would consider cyber risk management of enterprise networks under
Markov jump risk dynamics.
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